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Wiretapping and the Modern Marriage:
Does Title III Provide a Federal Remedy
for Victims of Interspousal Electronic
Surveillance?
I. Introduction
Electronic surveillance is now being employed in the most sa-
cred of all social relationships, the institution of marriage. Husbands
and wives, suspicious of spousal infidelity, are resorting increasingly
to wiretapping the telephone in the marital home to gather condemn-
ing evidence in anticipation of future divorce and child custody
proceedings.
In recent years, state' and federal2 courts have decided numer-
ous cases on the interception of telephone conversations of one
spouse by the other without the knowledge or consent of the spouse
being wiretapped. The actions have been brought pursuant to Title
III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 19683
which was enacted to regulate all wiretapping and eavesdropping ac-
tivities. The resulting court opinions have been far from consistent.
While many courts view Title III as a flat ban on all unauthorized
interceptions of wire communications, 4 others have read into it an
implied exception for marital partners based on the common law
1. State v. Jock, 404 A.2d 518 (Del. Super. 1979); Burgess v. Burgess, 447 So.2d 220
(Fla. 1984); Markham v. Markham, 265 So.2d 59 (Fla. App. 1972), affd, 272 So.2d 813 (Fla.
1973); Ransom v. Ransom, 253 Ga. 656, 324 S.E.2d 437 (1985); Stamme v. Stamme, 589
S.W.2d 50 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979); Rickenbaker v. Rickenbaker, 290 N.C. 373, 226 S.E.2d 347
(1976); Beaber v. Beaber, 41 Ohio Misc. 95, 322 N.E.2d 910 (1974); Baumrind v. Ewing, 276
S.C. 350, 279 S.E.2d 359 (1981).
2. Pritchard v. Pritchard, 732 F.2d 372 (4th Cir. 1984); Citron v. Citron, 539 F. Supp.
621 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), affd, 722 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 973 (1984);
United States v. Rizzo, 583 F.2d 907 (7th Cir. 1978); Anonymous v. Anonymous, 558 F.2d
677 (2d Cir. 1977); White v. Weiss, 535 F.2d 1067 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. Jones,
542 F.2d 661 (6th Cir. 1976); Simpson v. Simpson, 490 F.2d 803 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 897 (1974); Lizza v. Lizza, 631 F. Supp. 529 (E.D.N.Y. 1986); Flynn v. Flynn, 560 F.
Supp. 922 (N.D. Ohio 1983); Heyman v. Heyman, 548 F. Supp. 1041 (N.D. III. 1982); Gill v.
Wilier, 482 F. Supp. 776 (W.D.N.Y. 1980); Kratz v. Kratz, 477 F. Supp. 463 (E.D. Pa.
1979); London v. London, 420 F. Supp. 944 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Remington v. Remington, 393
F. Supp. 898 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
3. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2510-2520 (West 1984) (hereinafter Title 111).
4. See Pritchard v. Pritchard, 732 F.2d 372 (4th Cir. 1984); United States v. Jones, 542
F.2d 661 (6th Cir. 1976); Heyman v. Heyman, 548 F. Supp. 1041 (N.D. Ill. 1982); Kratz v.
Kratz, 477 F. Supp. 463 (E.D. Pa. 1979). See also S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess.,
reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2112, 2113 [hereinafter S. REP. No. 10971.
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doctrine of interspousal immunity.5
This comment explores the respective roles Title III and the
doctrine of interspousal immunity play in cases of interspousal elec-
tronic surveillance. It then analyzes the legislative history of Title
III, basic rules of statutory interpretation, the concepts of inter-
spousal immunity and marital privacy, and current case law, finding
that interspousal wiretaps fall within the purview of the Act. The
comment concludes that federal law may be the most appropriate
avenue of recourse for victims of interspousal wiretapping since it
cannot be preempted by the inconsistent application of state laws
which may encompass interspousal immunity.
II. Title III
A. The Purpose and Impact of Enactment
Congress enacted Title III to protect "the privacy of wire and
oral communications, and . . .[to delineate] on a uniform basis the
circumstances and conditions under which the interception[s] ...
may be authorized." 6 It prohibits all interceptions except those
granted to a duly authorized law enforcement officer by a court as
provided in the Act.7 Criminal8 and civil9 remedies are available to
5. See Simpson v. Simpson, 490 F.2d 803 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 897 (1974);
Lizza v. Lizza, 631 F. Supp. 529 (E.D.N.Y. 1986); London v. London, 420 F. Supp. 944
(S.D.N.Y. 1976).
6. S. REP. No. 1097, supra note 4, at 2153.
7. Id. See also 18 U.S.C.A. § 2517.
8. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2511 (1) provides:
(I) Except as otherwise specifically provided in this chapter any person
who-
(a) willfully intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures any other
person to intercept or endeavor to intercept any wire or oral
communication;
(b) willfully uses, endeavors to use, or procures any other person to
use or endeavor to use any electronic, mechanical, or other device to in-
tercept any oral communication when -
(i) such device is affixed to, or otherwise transmits a signal
through, a wire, cable, or other like connection used in wire com-
munication; or
(ii) such device transmits communications by radio, or inter-
feres with the transmission of such communication; or
(iii) such person knows, or has reason to know, that such de-
vice or any component thereof has been sent through the mail or
transported in interstate or foreign commerce; or
(iv) such use or endeavor to use (A) takes place on the prem-
ises of any business or other commercial establishment the opera-
tions of which affect interstate or foreign commerce; or (B) ob-
tains or is for the purpose of obtaining information relating to the
operations of any business or other commercial establishment the
operations of which affect interstate or foreign commerce; or
WIRETAPPING
victims of unlawful interception 0 and disclosure of wire11 and oral 2
communications.
Title III was a congressional response to the inherent deficien-
cies in the Federal Communications Act of 1934,13 which prohibited
(v) such person acts in the District of Columbia, the Com-
monwealth of Puerto Rico, or any territory or possession of the
United States;
(c) willfully discloses, or endeavors to disclose, to any other person
the contents of any wire or oral communications, knowing or having rea-
son to know that the information was obtained through the interception
of a wire or oral communication in violation of this subsection; or
(d) willfully uses, or endeavors to use, the contents of any wire or
oral communication, knowing or having reason to know that the informa-
tion was obtained through the interception of a wire or oral communica-
tion in violation of this subsection; shall be fined not more than $10,000
or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
9. 18 U.C.S.A. § 2520 provides that:
Any person whose wire or oral communication is intercepted, disclosed, or
used in violation of this chapter shall (I) have a civil cause of action against any
person who intercepts, discloses, or uses, or procures any other person to inter-
cept, disclose, or use such communications, and (2) be entitled to recover from
any such person-
(a) actual damages but not less than liquidated damages computed
at the rate of $100 a day for each day of violation or $1,000, whichever is
higher;
(b) punitive damages; and
(c) a reasonable attorney's fee and other litigation costs reasonably
incurred.
A good faith reliance on a court order or on the provisions of section
2518(7) of this chapter shall constitute a complete defense to any civil or crimi-
nal action brought under this chapter.
Title Ill was amended very recently. Its new provisions were published in December 1986.
The Act now sets forth restrictions and imposes civil and criminal sanctions for the unlawful
interception of "electronic communications" as well as retaining those on "wire" and "oral"
communications. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 1986
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS §§ 101-109 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2510-2520).
This was done to provide protection against unauthorized interceptions in areas of recent tech-
nological advancement, e.g., cellular and cordless telephones, pen registers, electronic mail, etc.
See S. REP. No. 99-541, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 3555-57. The new provisions are beyond the scope of this comment.
10. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2510(4) states that:
"intercept" means the aural acquisition of the contents of any wire or oral
communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other device.
II. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2510(I) states that:
"wire communication" means any communication made in whole or in part
through the use of facilities for the transmission of communications by the aid of
wire, cable, or other like connection between the point of origin and the point of
reception furnished or operated by any person engaged as a common carrier in
providing or operating such facilities for the transmission of interstate or foreign
communications.
12. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2510(2) states that:
"oral communication" means any oral communication uttered by a person
exhibiting an expectation that such communication is not subject to interception
under circumstances justifying such expectation.
13. 47 U.S.C.A. § 605 (West 1962) provided in part that:
No person receiving or assisting in receiving, or transmitting, or assisting in
transmitting, any interstate or foreign communication by wire or radio shall di-
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the disclosure of protected communications. Under the previous act,
private citizens were free to ignore the restrictions set forth in its
provisions with no apprehension of sanctions.1 4 Furthermore, law en-
forcement officers could not use electronic surveillance as an investi-
gative tool, no matter how heinous the crime under investigation. 1
In its final form, Title III combined two bills proposed in 196716
with ideas advanced by its author, Professor Robert Blakey.17 The
Act adhered to the standards set forth in Berger v. New York"8 and
Katz v. United States,9 cases which developed procedural safe-
guards against abuse in the issuance of electronic surveillance war-
rants20 and instituted additional constitutional prerequisites in these
areas of the law respectively. 21 These two court decisions had laid
the framework for the much needed regulatory standard that pro-
vided sanctions for all electronic surveillance activities conducted in
an unlawful manner.22
vulge or publish the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning
thereof, except through authorized channels of transmission or reception ....
This section was amended after the enactment of Title III to supply all of the necessary re-
strictions on the interception of wire and oral communications not referred to in the new Act.
See 47 U.S.C.A. § 605 (Supp. 1986).
14. J. CARR, THE LAW OF ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE § 2.1 (2d ed. 1986).
47 U.S.C.A. § 605 contained a proviso that stated:
this section shall not apply to the receiving, divulging, publishing, or utiliz-
ing the contents of any radio communication broadcast, or transmitted by ama-
teurs or others for the use of the general public, or relating to ships in distress.
15. J. CARR, supra note 14, at § 2.1. Title IIl remedied this flaw by specifically identify-
ing which crimes were subject to authorized surveillance. See infra note 29.
16. See generally S. 675, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. (1967) and S. 2050, 90th Cong., Ist
Sess. (1967). These bills are entitled the Federal Interception Act and the Electronic Surveil-
lance Act of 1967, respectively.
17. See President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice,
Task Force Report: Organized Crime 103 (1967); Blakey and Hancock, A Proposed Elec-
tronic Surveillance Control Act, 43 N.D. LAWYER 657 (1968). Robert Blakey was the primary
draftsman of Title Ill. He had formerly acted as counsel for the Justice Department but was
teaching at Notre Dame Law School during the formulation of Title 111. J. CARR, supra note
14, § 2.3.
18. 388 U.S. 41 (1967) (New York statute permitting electronic surveillance found
unconstitutional).
19. 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (electronic surveillance of a public telephone booth by govern-
mental officials deemed improper).
20. 388 U.S. at 54-60. For a succinct overview of the procedural safeguards advanced in
the Berger decision see Fishman, The Interception of Communications Without a Court Or-
der: Title Ii, Consent, and the Expectation of Privacy, 51 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 41, 42 n.4.
21.
Wherever a man may be, he is entitled to know that he will remain free
from unreasonable searches and seizures. The government agents here ignored
the procedure of antecedent justification . . . that is central to the Fourth
Amendment, a procedure that we hold to be a constitutional precondition of the
kind of electronic surveillance involved in this case.
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967) (footnote omitted).
22. For an indepth discussion and an historical overview of Title Ill and the law of
electronic surveillance see generally Goldsmith, The Supreme Court and Title III: Rewriting
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In response to the enactment of Title Il, state legislatures for-
mulated statutes regulating electronic surveillance. A few states
merely amended their existing laws to conform to the Act,23 while
others instituted new legislation strictly following the provisions of
Title 111.24 While state law may be more restrictive than federal law,
Title III strictly limits the circumstances under which surveillance
activities are permissible.2 5 If these minimum standards are not met
and there is a question as to what law applies, the federal law will
ultimately prevail. 6
B. The Legislative History
Despite the clarity of the Act's statutory language, courts have
held differing views as to its actual scope. 7 The controversy over the
applicability of Title III to cases of interspousal electronic surveil-
lance has led to exhaustive reviews of the congressional hearings held
prior to its enactment.2 8
the Law of Electronic Surveillance, 74 J. CRIM. L. AND CRIMINOLOGY 1 (1983).
23. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3010 (1978 & Supp. 1986); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-
62 (1982); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 99 (West 1970); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §
179.470 (1986); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 700.20 (1984); ORE. REV. STAT. ANN. § 133.724
(1985); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.73.130 (1986).
24. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-15-102(2) (1978 & Supp. 1984); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 54-41c (West 1985); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. II § 1336(h) (Supp. 1984); D.C. CODE
ANN. § 23-547 (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 934.07 (West 1985); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 803-
46 (Supp. 1984); IDAHO CODE § 18-6706 (1979 & Supp. 1986); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-2515
(1981); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:1308 (Supp. 1986); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §
10-408 (1984 & Supp. 1986); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626A.06 (1983 & Supp. 1987); NEB. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 86-705 (1981); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 570-A:7 (1974); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
2A:156A-9 (Supp. 1986); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-12-3 (1978); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §
176.9 (1983); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5709 (Purdon 1983); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-5.1-2
(1956 & Supp. 1986); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-35A-4 (Supp. 1986); TEX. CRIM.
PRO. CODE ANN. art. 18.20, § 8 (Supp. 1986); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-23a-10 (1982); VA.
CODE § 19.2-68 (1983); WiS. STAT. ANN. § 968.30 (West 1985). See generally J. CARR, supra
note 14, at § 2.4.
25. J. CARR, supra note 14, at § 2.4(a).
26. Id.
27. C. SANDS, SUTHERLAND'S STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 48.01 (4th ed. 1984) refers
to the use of legislative history in determining the meaning of a statute. It states that "the
plainer the language, the more convincing contrary legislative history must be to overcome the
natural purport of a statute's language." Id.
Courts are reluctant to resort to legislative history to determine the scope of a statutory
provision. Legislative history is frequently vague and ambiguous. Therefore, whenever the lan-
guage is clear, the meaning of a statute will usually rest solely upon its text. See Patagonia
Corp. v. Board of Governors of Federal Reserve System, 517 F.2d 803, 813 (9th Cir. 1975).
28. The legislative history of Title III consists of the following hearings: Hearings on the
Right to Privacy Act of 1967 Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and Procedure
of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., Ist Sess., pts. I & 2 (1967); Hearings on
the Anti-Crime Program Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th
Cong., Ist Sess. (1967); Hearings on Controlling Crime Through More Effective Law En-
forcement Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. (1967); Hearings on the Criminal Laws and Procedures
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Although the control of organized crime was the primary objec-
tive of Title 111,29 the legislative history revealed a general awareness
Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Comm. on the Judici-
ary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966); Hearings on Invasions of Privacy Before the Subcomm. on
Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong.,
pts. I-6 (1965-1966); Special Inquiry on Invasion of Privacy Before the Special Subcomm. on
Invasion of Privacy of the House Gov't Operations Comm., 89th Cong., Ist Sess. (1965);
Hearings on Wiretapping, the Attorney General's Program Before the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962).
29. S. REP. No. 1097, supra note 4, at 2157.
In United States v. Giordano, the Supreme Court stated:
The purpose of the legislation, which was passed in 1968, was effectively to
prohibit, on the pain of criminal and civil penalties, all interception of oral and
wire communications to law enforcement officers when authorized by court order
in connection with the investigation of the serious crimes listed in § 2516.
416 U.S. 505, 514 (1974).
18 U.S.C.A. § 2516(1) provides that:
The Attorney General, or any Assistant Attorney General specially desig-
nated by the Attorney General, may authorize an application to a Federal judge
of competent jurisdiction for, and such judge may grant in conformity with sec-
tion 2518 of this chapter an order authorizing or approving the interception of
wire or oral communications by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, or a Fed-
eral agency having responsibility for the investigation of the offense as to which
the application is made, when such interception may provide or has provided
evidence of-
(a) any offense punishable by death or by imprisonment for more
than one year under sections 2274 through 2277 of title 42 of the United
States Code (relating to the enforcement of the Atomic Energy Act of
1954), or under the following chapters of this title: chapter 37 (relating to
espionage), chapter 105 (relating to sabotage), chapter 115 (relating to
treason), or chapter 102 (relating to riots);
(b) a violation of section 186 or section 501(c) of title 29, United
States Code (dealing with restrictions on payments and loans to labor
organizations), or any offense which involves murder, kidnapping, rob-
bery, or extortion, and which is punishable under this title;
(c) any offense which is punishable under the following sections of
this title: section 201 (bribery of public officials and witnesses), section
224 (bribery in sporting contests), section 1084 (transmission of wagering
information), section 1503 (influencing or injuring an officer, juror, or
witness generally), section 1510 (obstruction of criminal investigations),
section 1751 (Presidential assassinations, kidnapping, and assault), sec-
tion 1951 (interference with commerce by threats or violence), section
1952 (interstate and foreign travel or transportation in aid of racketeer-
ing enterprises), section 1954 (offer, acceptance, or solicitation to influ-
ence operations of employee benefit plan), section 659 (theft from inter-
state shipment), section 664 (embezzlement from pension and welfare
funds), or sections 2314 and 2315 (interstate transportation of stolen
property);
(d) any offense involving counterfeiting punishable under section
471, 472, or 473 of this title;
(e) any offense involving bankruptcy fraud or the manufacture, im-
portation, receiving, concealment, buying, selling, or otherwise dealing in
narcotic drugs, marijuana, or other dangerous drugs, punishable under
any law of the United States;
(f) any offense including extortionate credit transactions under sec-
tions 892, 893, or 894 of this title; or
(g) any conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing offenses.
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and recognition by Congress that the use of electronic surveillance
within the marital relationship was widespread. 0 Professor Robert
Blakey, 81 the primary drafter of Title III, strongly advocated the re-
strictive provisions of the Act and recognized the need to apply them
to private citizens, including spouses. While testifying at a congres-
sional hearing, Professor Blakey stated that "Private bugging in this
country can be divided into two broad categories, commercial espio-
nage and marital litigation."3 " This acknowledgment is but one of
many statements made during the congressional hearings on elec-
tronic surveillance which make reference to interspousal wiretap-
ping.33 The need to regulate the practice seemed apparent.
In determining the congressional intent of a statute, an analysis
of legislative history is ordinarily avoided if the provision is clear and
unambiguous.3 4 The language of Title III is clear and unambiguous;
its provisions are comprehensive and all inclusive.85 The Act specifi-
30. Congress recognized the widespread abuse of electronic surveillance in all areas of
life, including the marital relationship, on numerous occasions. An example of its awareness
was demonstrated in the following statement:
The tremendous scientific and technological developments that have taken
place in the last century have made possible today the widespread use and abuse
of electronic surveillance techniques. As a result of these developments, privacy
of communication is seriously jeopardized by these techniques of surveillance.
Commercial and employer-labor espionage is becoming widespread. It is becom-
ing increasingly difficult to conduct business meetings in private. Trade secrets
are betrayed. Labor and management plans are revealed. No longer is it possi-
ble, in short, for each man to retreat into his home and be left alone. Every
spoken word [relative] to each man's personal, marital, religious, political, or
commercial concerns can be intercepted by an unseen auditor and turned against
the speaker to the auditor's advantage.
S. REP. No. 1097, supra note 4, at 2154.
Senator Long testified as to the extent of private electronic surveillance in this country
and identified the three major areas of concern:
The three large areas of snooping in this [non-governmental] field are (I)
industrial (2) divorce cases, and (3) politics. So far, we have heard no real justi-
fication for continuance of snooping in these three areas. If any justification ex-
ists, we will probably hear about it in the next few weeks as we expect to explore
this terrain thoroughly.
Hearings on Invasions of Privacy Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Practice & Procedure
of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 5 at 2261 (1965-66).
31. See supra note 17. See also United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 517-18 n.7
(1974); United States v. Hall, 488 F.2d 193, 197 n.7 (9th Cir. 1973).
32. Hearings on the Right to Privacy Act of 1967 Before the Subcomm. on Admin.
Practice & Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2 at
413 (1967).
33. See supra note 30. See also infra note 100 and accompanying text.
34. See United States v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 643, 648 (1961). See also United States v.
Jones, 542 F.2d 661, 667 (6th Cir. 1976). In Patagonia Corp. v. Board of Governors of Fed-
eral Reserve System, 517 F.2d 803, 813 (9th Cir. 1975), the Ninth Circuit made a firm state-
ment as to the determination of the congressional intent of a statute: "[TIhe best evidence of
that intent is the text of the statute itself."
35. In a Senate report pertaining to Title III, it was stated that "[18 U.S.C.A. §
2511(1)(a)] establishes a blanket prohibition against the interception of any wire communica-
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cally defines all of the exceptions to its proscriptions."s Interspousal
wiretaps are not among the enumerated exceptions. Despite this fact,
several courts have chosen to recognize an "implied exception" for
spousal offenses under the common law doctrine of interspousal im-
munity.87 In order to comprehend fully this rationale, it is necessary
first to obtain an understanding of the history behind interspousal
tion." S. REP. No. 1097, supra note 4, at 2180. The report also stated that "the definition [of
.person' in 18 U.S.C.A. § 2510(6)] is intended to be comprehensive." Id. at 2179.
18 U.S.C.A. § 2510(6) defines "person" as: "any employee, or agent of the United States
or any State or political subdivision thereof, and any individual, partnership, association, joint
stock company, trust, or corporation."
36. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2511(2), (3) provides:
(2)(a) It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for an operator of a
switch-board, or an officer, employee, or agent of any communication common
carrier, whose facilities are used in the transmission of a wire communication, to
intercept, disclose, or use that communication in the normal course of his em-
ployment while engaged in any activity which is a necessary incident to the ren-
dition of his service or to the protection of the rights or property of the carrier of
such communication: Provided, That said communication common carriers shall
not utilize service observing or random monitoring except for mechanical or ser-
vice quality control checks. (emphasis in original).
(b) It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for an officer, employee, or
agent of the Federal Communications Commission, in the normal course of his
employment and in discharge of the monitoring responsibilities exercised by the
Commission in the enforcement of chapter 5 of title 47 of the United States
Code, to intercept a wire communication, or oral communication transmitted by
radio, or to disclose or use the information thereby obtained.
(c) It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for a person acting under
color of law to intercept a wire or oral communication, where such person is a
party to the communication or one of the parties to the communication has given
prior consent to such interception.
(d) It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for a person not acting under
color of law to intercept a wire or oral communication where such person is a
party to the communication or where one of the parties to the communication
has given prior consent to such interception unless such communication is inter-
cepted for the purpose of committing any criminal or tortious act in violation of
the Constitution or laws of the United States or of any State or for the purpose
of committing any other injurious act.
(3) Nothing contained in this chapter or in section 605 of the Communica-
tions Act of 1934 (48 Stat. 1143; 47 U.S.C. 605) shall limit the constitutional
power of the President to take such measures as he deems necessary to protect
the Nation against actual or potential attack or other hostile acts of a foreign
power, to obtain foreign intelligence information deemed essential to the security
of the United States, or to protect national security information against foreign
intelligence activities. Nor shall anything contained in this chapter be deemed to
limit the constitutional power of the President to take such measures as he
deems necessary to protect the United States against the overthrow of the Gov-
ernment by force or other unlawful means, or against any other clear and pre-
sent danger to the structure or existence of the Government. The contents of any
wire or oral communication intercepted by authority of the President in the exer-
cise of the foregoing powers may be received in evidence in any trial hearing, or
other proceedings only where such interception was reasonable, and shall not be
otherwise used or disclosed except as is necessary to implement that power.
37. See, e.g., Anonymous v. Anonymous, 558 F.2d 677 (2d Cir. 1977); Simpson v.
Simpson, 490 F.2d 803 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 897 (1974); Lizza v. Lizza, 631 F.
Supp. 529 (E.D.N.Y. 1986); London v. London, 420 F. Supp. 944 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
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immunity.
III. Interspousal Immunity: An Historical Overview of Common
Law and Present Day Rationales
The doctrine of interspousal tort immunity originated at com-
mon law. It developed out of the concept that husband and wife be-
came one person upon marriage. 8  According to Blackstone:
By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law:
that is, the very being or legal existence of the woman is sus-
pended during the marriage, or at least is incorporated and con-
solidated into that of the husband: under whose wing, protection
and, cover, she performs everything . . ..
The foundation of this common law theory is often traced to the
Bible4 0 or early Roman law. 1
Since the wife's legal existence merged into that of her husband,
she was incapable of contracting for herself. In addition, she was
unable to sue or be sued in her own name. 2 If she wished to bring a
cause of action against her husband, he would have to initiate it on
her behalf and be joined as a plaintiff in addition to being named as
defendant. 4  This would inevitably result in the husband suing him-
self. In addition to the husband's control over his wife's power to
contract and to sue, he also retained possession of her property, real
and personal." The law held the husband responsible for all of his
wife's torts whether they were committed prior to or during their
marriage.'5 For these reasons, it was inconceivable that a tort action
38. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 122 (4th ed. 1971); H. CLARK,
LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES § 9.1 (1968).
39. I W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *430.
40. W. PROSSER, supra note 38, at § 122. Passages from the Bible continually emphasize
the "oneness" of man and woman. See, e.g., Genesis 2:23 ("And Adam said, This is now bone
of my bones, and flesh of my flesh: she shall be called woman, because she was taken out of
man."); Ephesians 5:31 ("For the cause shall a man leave his father and mother, and shall be
joined into his wife, and they two shall be one flesh.") This concept is reiterated in the New
Testament. See Matthew 19:5-6; Mark 10:8. See also Williams, The Legal Unity of Husband
and Wife, I0 MOD. L. REV. 16 (1947).
41. W. PROSSER, supra note 38, at § 122. See also Comment, Interspousal Tort Immu-
nity-California Follows the Trend, 36 So. CAL. L. REv. 456, 459 (1963); J. BRYCE. STUDIES
IN HISTORY AND JURISPRUDENCE 819 (1968).
42. W. PROSSER, supra note 38, at § 122; H. CLARK, supra note 38, at § 9.1.
43. 2 F. HARPER, F. JAMES & 0. GRAY, THE LAW OF TORTS § 8.10 (2d ed. 1986).
44. W. PROSSER, supra note 38, at § 122.
45. Id. See also 2 F. HARPER, F. JAMES & 0. GRAY, supra note 43, at § 8.10. See
generally McCurdy, Personal Injury Torts Between Spouses, 4 VILL. L. REV. 303, 303-07
(1959) [hereinafter Personal Injury Torts]; Sanford, Personal Torts Within the Family, 9
VAND. L. REV. 823, 825 (1956). For further discussions on the common law unity of husband
and wife in relation to the wife's inability to contract, sue or hold property, see McCurdy,
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could be maintained by one spouse against the other.
Beginning in the mid-nineteenth century Married Women's
Property Acts, eventually passed in every state, removed the com-
mon law legal disability of the wife.4 6 These statutes enabled a mar-
ried women to enjoy a separate legal identity from that of her hus-
band and a separate legal estate in her own property.47 They granted
the wife the ability to control her property and the capability to sue
or be sued independent of her husband,4'8 which meant that she was
unilaterally responsible for all torts she committed."'
Despite the abolition of the legal unity theory, courts retained
the doctrine of interspousal immunity for cases involving personal
torts.50 Currently, the trend is toward partial or total abrogation of
the doctrine. 51 The jurisdictions which support its retention justify its
application on several public policy grounds.52
Of the arguments asserted in defense of the doctrine, the pre-
vailing one is that interspousal immunity prevents the disruption of
domestic harmony and peace within the marital relationship. 53
Courts espousing this argument proclaim that there is a compelling
state interest in the marital unit which must be fostered and pro-
tected,54 and in the absence of immunity, they would be acting con-
trary to the policy of law which emphasizes preservation of
marriages.
This justification has been widely criticized. It is noted that the
tort or harm often would not have been committed without the prior
existence of a substantial amount of marital discord.55 In addition,
Torts Between Person in Domestic Relation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 1030, 1031-35 (1930) [herein-
after Torts in Domestic Relation].
46. W. PROSSER, supra note 38, at § 122.
47. See McCurdy, Personal Injury Torts, supra note 45, at 307-09; Sanford, supra note
45, at 825; McCurdy, Torts in Domestic Relation, supra note 45, at 1036-37.
48. 2 F. HARPER, F. JAMES & 0. GRAY, supra note 43, at § 8.10.
49. W. PROSSER, supra note 44, at § 122.
50. Id.
51. For a comprehensive compilation of the jurisdictions and their positions as to the
doctrine of interspousal tort immunity see Note, Husband and Wife - Interspousal Immunity
for Intentional Torts is Unconstitutionally Irrational - Moran v. Beyer, 58 TEMP. L.Q. 709
n.1 (1985) (citations are given for those jurisdictions which have retained the doctrine as well
as those which have partially and totally abrogated the doctrine).
52. W. PROSSER, supra note 38, at § 122; H. CLARK, supra note 38, at § 9.1.
53. See Case Note, The Unwarranted Abrogation of Interspousal Tort Immunity: Fer-
ando v. Romo, 1984 B.Y.U. L. REV. 253, 261-63; Moore, The Case for Retention of Inter-
spousal Tort Immunity, 7 OHio N.U.L. REV. 943, 944 (1980).
54. See, e.g., Hill v. Hill, 415 So.2d 20, 23 (Fla. 1982), where the court stated that
"[tihe family continues to be an unofficial sociological governmental structure necessary and
vital to our free, independent society."
55. See Moore, supra note 53, at 944. See also Comment, Toward Abolition of Inter-
spousal Tort Immunity, 36 MONT. L. REV. 251, 256 (1975).
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the institution of a lawsuit by one spouse against the other may indi-
cate that the domestic harmony the state seeks to preserve by
preventing the lawsuit no longer exists, and, therefore, need not be
protected.56
A second justification for the retention of interspousal immunity
is that it prevents fraud and collusion between suing spouses'57 a
threat which supposedly increases dramatically if the tortfeasor
spouse possesses liability insurance. It further prevents the enjoy-
ment of insurance rewards granted to the "injured" spouse by the
spouse who committed the tort. 8
Courts have been generally reluctant to endorse this type of
claim, citing the judicial system's ability to sort through all claims
and specifically deny the fraudulent ones.59 They further state that it
is more equitable to provide adequate remedies for victims of inter-
spousal torts than to deny all claims in order to avoid the small per-
centage which may prove to be fraudulent.60
A final justification for the retention of the immunity doctrine is
that it shields the court system from an influx of wholly unwarranted
and frivolous claims brought by disgruntled spouses who perceive the
courts as the proper forum for seeking revenge on their marital part-
ner.61 Although this principle has been continually asserted, it has
not been proven that the actual number of spurious lawsuits has in-
creased substantially in states which have abrogated interspousal
immunity.62
Advocates of the immunity doctrine deny that it prevents
spousal victims from obtaining adequate remedies for harms com-
mitted upon them, citing criminal prosecutions and divorce proceed-
ings as alternative sources from which to seek satisfaction.63 These
56. See Moore, supra note 53, at 944; Comment, supra note 55, at 256. See also W.
PROSSER, supra note 44, at § 122 (the rationale of preserving marital harmony is "based on
the bold theory that after a husband has beaten his wife, there is a state of peace and harmony
left to be disturbed .... ).
57. W. PROSSER, supra note 38, at § 122; H. CLARK, supra note 38, at § 9.1.
58. See Note, supra note 53, at 259; Moore, supra note 53, at 945; Comment, supra
note 55, at 257-58.
59. See, e.g., Rupert v. Stienne, 90 Nev. 397, 401, 528 P.2d 1013, 1015 (1974), where
the court stated:
However, to deny one spouse the opportunity to recover for the tortious con-
duct of the other because of the possibility of fraud and collusion belies the
centuries old trust in our jury system .... Our adversary system will ferret out
the nonmeritorious claims and dispatch those who would practice fraud upon the
courts.
60. See Comment, supra note 55, at 258.
61. See Moore, supra note 53, at 948-50.
62. See Comment, supra note 55, at 256-57.
63. Id. at 259. See also Note, supra note 51, at 715-16.
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avenues, however, are available only for those who seek to sever a
marriage completely. Many spouses seek compensation only, a rem-
edy which cannot be acquired through a criminal prosecution or the
filing of a divorce decree.
64
Finally, those who favor interspousal immunity usually posit
that the legislature is responsible for making any alterations in the
common law that would lead to substantial changes in its application
and in its results. 65 In response to this argument, however, opponents
of the doctrine contend that the judiciary may change the common
law since it was the judiciary that created it.66 This view alludes that
the immunity doctrine was based on faulty reasoning of the judici-
ary; therefore, it is the responsibility of the courts to correct their
mistake.
67
Presently, several courts have adopted interspousal immunity as
a justification for implying an exception from the scope of Title III
for spouses who utilize electronic eavesdropping devices within the
home.66 The vast majority of courts have refuted this logic with
many of the same criticisms traditionally levelled at the retention of
the interspousal immunity doctrine." These criticisms appear even
more compelling when applied to interspousal wiretapping. First,
electronic eavesdropping is an intentional act committed to obtain
private information. When it is directed against a spouse, it can be
assumed that there are already difficulties in the marriage. Inter-
spousal wiretapping is not an act commonly committed by spouses
who love and respect their marital partners. The most common pur-
pose of an interspousal wiretap is to acquire information for use in
divorce proceedings; 70 therefore, interspousal immunity does not ac-
complish the goal of preserving the marriage in cases where inter-
spousal wiretapping has occurred. Second, the probability of fraudu-
lent and collusive lawsuits is extremely minute, particularly in cases
where criminal charges are filed. Third, spouses should not be denied
civil remedies solely because of their status. Even though remedies
are available in the criminal and divorce courts, marital partners
64. Comment, supra note 55, at 259-60. Various considerations are mentioned which
refute this justification.
65. See Annot., 92 A.L.R.3d 901, 918 (1979). See also Moore, supra note 53, at 948.
66. See Comment, supra note 55, at 260-61. See also Comment, Interspousal Elec-
tronic Surveillance Immunity, 7 U. OF TOLEDO L. REV. 185, 194 (1975) [hereinafter Elec-
tronic Surveillance Immunity].
67. Comment, Electronic Surveillance Immunity, supra note 66, at 194 n.43.
68. See supra note 5. It should be noted that the courts that recognize interspousal
immunity in wiretap cases are all located in the State of New York.
69. See supra note 4.
70. See supra notes 1-2.
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should not be strictly limited to the remedies of these courts. Finally,
in applying Title III in interspousal wiretap cases, the courts are ap-
plying a federal law regulating electronic surveillance and, therefore,
a state law should not subvert it.71 These principles will be examined
further in conjunction with the current case law.
IV. Federal Court Decisions on Interspousal Wiretapping
A. The Beginning. Simpson v. Simpson72
Federal courts are not in agreement as to whether the restrictive
provisions of Title III contemplate the interception of wire communi-
cations by one spouse within the marital home.73 Simpson v. Simp-
son74 was the first opinion of a federal court that dealt directly with
this issue. Mr. Simpson had placed a wiretap on the telephone in his
home to determine whether his wife had been unfaithful to the mar-
riage. Once he had gathered the necessary information, he proceeded
to play the taped conversations of Mrs. Simpson and another man to
various people. 75 As a result, his wife agreed to an uncontested di-
vorce.76 She then instituted a civil suit77 against her husband to re-
cover damages for his actions pursuant to Title 111.78
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals based its decision on both
an analysis of Title III's statutory language and the legislative intent
of Congress in enacting it."9 The court conceded that the naked in-
clusive language of the Act incorporated interspousal wiretap cases
but it went on to state that Congress had not intended a result which
would extend into personal family relations.80 Traditionally, the reso-
lution of domestic conflicts had been left to the control of the
71. See supra note 26.
72. 490 F.2d 803 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 897 (1974).
73. Exemptions to Title III have not been extended beyond the marital relationship.
This was demonstrated in United States v. Schrimsher, 493 F.2d 848 (5th Cir. 1974). In
Schrimsher, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a cause of action could be brought
against a man who intercepted the telephone calls of his former lover. The defendant had
never been married to the woman involved and possessed no legal right to be on the premises.
Therefore, there was no question as to whether his actions were prohibited under the Act
under section 2511.
74. 490 F.2d 803 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 897 (1974).
75. Id. at 804. Mr. Simpson disclosed the contents of the recorded conversations to sev-
eral neighbors, family members and an attorney.
76. Id. Mrs. Simpson was persuaded to agree to an uncontested divorce upon the advice
of the attorney to whom Mr. Simpson had disclosed the wiretap evidence.
77. See supra note 9.
78. 490 F.2d at 804.
79. See generally id. at 804-09.
80. Id. at 805.
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states.81 Therefore, the court concluded that federal law should not
prevail in cases where the questionable conduct is regulated by state
law.82 The court noted that in addition to creating a federal remedy
for domestic conflicts, the application of Title III would, in effect,
override the doctrine of interspousal immunity which many states
still employed in cases of personal torts. 8
The court of appeals in Simpson resorted to an extensive review
of the legislative materials available84 to determine the intent of
Congress and, as a result, concluded that Title III was not enacted
to regulate interspousal electronic surveillance. The court surmised
that Title III was inapplicable because of the congressional focus on
crime control and the lack of any explicit indications that the Act
was meant to delve into the privacy of the marital home. 85 It empha-
sized the fact that a large quantity of the testimony presented at the
legislative hearings in reference to domestic situations accentuated
the role assumed by private investigators in these conflicts.8 The
court distinguished between interceptions obtained solely by the
spouse and those procured with the assistance of a private
investigator:
[Tjo our minds a third-party intrusion into the marital
home, even if instigated by one spouse, is an offense against a
spouse's privacy of a much greater magnitude than is personal
surveillance by the other spouse. The latter, it seems to this
court, is consistent with whatever expectations of privacy
spouses might have vis-a-vis each other within the marital
home. 8
7
The court did not deny that Congress possessed a general
awareness of the existence of interspousal wiretapping but found that
Congress was not concerned with marital conduct when it formu-
lated the proscriptions of Title III.88 The court specifically pointed to
81. Id.
82. Id. at n.6. The court conceded that Congress has the power to legislate the result
sought by the appellant but it stated that this power is found in its authority to control inter-
state commerce.
83. Id. at 806 n.7.
84. See supra note 28.
85. 490 F.2d at 807. See generally S. REP. No. 1097, supra note 4.
86. 490 F.2d at 808.
87. Id. at 809. See also White v. Weiss, 535 F.2d 1067 (8th Cir. 1976) (Act encom-
passed surveillance by a private detective even though within the marital home and instigated
by one spouse against the other); United States v. Rizzo, 583 F.2d 907 (7th Cir. 1978) (no
implied derivative spousal immunity in favor of private investigator).
88. 490 F.2d at 807.
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the "extension phone"" exemption as being indistinguishable from
instances of interspousal electronic surveillance.90 It viewed this pro-
vision as indicative of a congressional intent to abstain from ruling
on personal acts within the family unit concerning the extent of pri-
vacy which may exist therein.9 1
B. The Challenge: United States v. Jones 2
Two years later, the same issue arose in the Sixth Circuit. In
United States v. Jones,93 a husband wiretapped the telephone of his
wife, from whom he had separated, when he became suspicious that
she was engaging in an extramarital affair.94 The damaging evidence
89. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(a)(i) states that:
(5) "electronic, mechanical, or other device" means any device or apparatus
which can be used to intercept a wire or oral communication other than-
(a) any telephone or telegraph instrument, equipment or facility, or
any component thereof, (i) furnished to the subscriber or user by a com-
munications common carrier in the ordinary course of its business and
being used by the subscriber or user in the ordinary course of its business.
This exemption may have been based in part on the testimony of Professor Herman
Schwartz who stated, "I take it nobody wants to make it a crime for a father to listen in on his
teenage daughter or some such related problem . . . .But this bill does not go to that and
goes beyond that." Hearings on the Anti-Crime Program Before the Subcomm. No. 5 of the
House Judiciary Comm., 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967) at 989.
90. 490 F.2d at 809. The court viewed section 2510(a)(i) as an exception to all eaves-
dropping activities within the home whether the act is merely listening to the conversation of
other family members or recording those conversations. For a more detailed analysis of the
"extension phone" exemption see Comment, Electronic Surveillance Immunity, supra note 66,
at 205-06.
91. 490 F.2d at 809. At the conclusion of its analysis, the court of appeals briefly reiter-
ated its findings with some apprehension. The court stated:
As should be obvious from the foregoing, we are not without doubts about
our decision. However, we have concluded that the statute is not sufficiently defi-
nite and specific to create a federal cause of action for the redress of appellant's
grievances against her former husband. Our decision is, of course, limited to the
specific facts of this case. No public official is involved, nor is any private person
other than appellee, and the locus in quo does not extend beyond the marital
home of the parties.
Id. at 810.
92. 542 F.2d 661 (6th Cir. 1976).
93. Id.
94. The court gave a brief synopsis of the series of events which occurred in Jones.
In the bill of particulars the Government stated that the residence was
owned by the grandmother of Appellee; that the telephone number was listed in
Appellee's name; that Appellee and his wife separated in July of 1974 and had
not lived together as man and wife after that date; that Appellee filed for divorce
on September 25, 1974; that on October 7, 1974 his wife was granted a re-
straining order by the Chancery Court prohibiting Appellee from "coming
about" her; that on January 20, 1975 the divorce decree was granted; and that
on one or more occasions Appellee had intercepted his wife's telephone conversa-
tions outside the curtilage of the residence.
Id. at 663.
The Appellee's affidavit set forth a fact pattern which differed from the Appellant's in
some respects.
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obtained by the wiretap was later utilized in divorce proceedings.9 5
Criminal charges9 were then instituted against the husband pursu-
ant to Title III.
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals emphasized the clear and
unambiguous nature of the Act, and stated that its purpose was to
provide a "blanket prohibition on all electronic surveillance except
under circumstances specifically enumerated in the statute." The
exceptions expressly set forth in the statutory provision failed to in-
corporate instances of interspousal wiretapping. 8 The court alluded
to the fact that if marital partners were to be among those excepted
Appellee submitted an affidavit with exhibits attached wherein he stated
that he paid the rent on the premises and the telephone bills during the period in
question; that he and his wife continued a sexual relationship even though he
had moved out of the house in late July of 1974; that he returned to the house
on occasion to babysit; that on October 18, 1974 while babysitting he became
suspicious that his wife was involved in an extramarital affair and placed a re-
cording device on the telephone; that the recordings of the intercepted telephone
calls confirmed his suspicions; and that he used the recordings to obtain a
divorce.
Id.
95. In subsequent Title III cases, the unlawfully obtained evidence has been held inad-
missible in court proceedings. 18 U.S.C. § 2515 states that:
Whenever any wire or oral communication has been intercepted, no part of
the contents of such communication and no evidence derived therefrom may be
received in evidence in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before any
court, grand jury, department, officer, agency, regulatory body, legislative com-
mittee, or other authority of the United States, a State, or a political subdivision
thereof if the disclosure of that information would be in violation of this chapter.
In United States v. Cianfrani, 573 F.2d 835, 855 (3d Cir. 1978), the court held that
section 2515 "prohibits use of contents of any communication, or any evidence derived there-
from, in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before any court . . . if the disclosure of
that information would be in violation of this chapter."
In United States v. Horton, 601 F.2d 319, 324 (7th Cir. 1979), the court stated that "the
section's primary purpose is apparently to exclude evidence derived from illegal, rather than
legal wiretaps."
The Horton court's view differed from Cianfrani in that it held that "the section's main
thrust is therefore to exclude evidence the seizure of which was in violation of the chapter, not
evidence the disclosure of which was or would be in violation of the chapter." Id.
96. See supra note 8. See generally Note, Criminal Law - Interspousal Electronic
Surveillance: Client and Attorney Liability Under Title III - Kratz v. Kratz, 53 TEMP. L.Q.
451 (1980); Note, Criminal Law - Private Eavesdropping - Second Circuit Finds Marital
Dispute Implicitly Exempted From the Federal Wiretapping Act. Anonymous v. Anonymous,
27 BUFF. L. REv. 139 (1978); Case Comment, Criminal Law - Interspousal Immunity is not
a Defense in Criminal Prosecution for Wiretapping - United States v. Jones, I I SUFF. L.
REV. 1367 (1977). For additional information on Title Ill cases which involve the institution
of criminal charges for interspousal electronic surveillance see Recent Decisions, Criminal Law
- Electronic Surveillance - Neither the Plain Language nor the Legislative History of Title
III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 Justifies an Implied Excep-
tion for Interspousal Wiretaps - United States v. Jones, 11 GA. L. REv. 427 (1977).
97. 542 F.2d at 667 (quoting United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 514 (1974)).
The court went on to state that "the natural presumption when construing a statute is that
Congress meant what it said." Id.
98. See supra note 36.
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from the scope of Title III's guidelines, Congress would have created
an explicit exception pertaining to this particular type of private con-
duct.99 As interpreted by the Jones court, the legislative materials
clarify the actual purpose of Title III and its characteristic of com-
prehensiveness. 100 The court quoted comments of Senator Hruska:
"A broad prohibition is imposed on private use of electronic surveil-
lance, particularly in domestic relations and industrial espionage
situations.'' 101
The court of appeals refused to acknowledge the distinction
made by the Simpson court between a private investigator and a
spouse who, acting alone, wiretaps the family telephone, 02 stating
that the harm suffered as a result of either party's actions would be
the same. Both parties to the wiretapped conversation would be una-
ware of the invasion; therefore, both would be unconsenting parties
to the interception whose privacy would be invaded equally. 103
The Jones court rejected the doctrine of interspousal immunity
as a valid justification for denying the relief afforded to private citi-
zens under Title 111.104 In defense of its decision, the court noted
that not all states had retained interspousal immunity. In fact, the
present trend was toward its abrogation. 105 Furthermore, there were
problems of uniformity since the doctrine was applied inconsistently.
Second, permitting interspousal immunity to bar relief in domestic
wiretaps would defeat the dual purposes of Title III articulated by
Congress. 10 Third, a doctrine based on state tort law should have no
bearing on the imposition of a federal law. 07 Fourth, even if the
courts were to consider interspousal immunity in civil actions, the
doctrine would be irrelevant in criminal proceedings where inter-
spousal immunity has never barred the imposition of criminal
charges between a husband and wife. 08
99. 542 F.2d at 671.
100. For example, Senator McClellan who co-sponsored Title III, stated "To assure the
privacy of oral and wire communications, title IIl prohibits all wiretapping and electronic sur-
veillance by persons other than duly authorized law enforcement officers." 542 F.2d at 669, n.
16.
101. S. REP. No. 1097, supra note 4, at 2274. Additional congressional findings were
also cited by the Jones court. See 542 F.2d at 667-69.
102. Id. at 670.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 672.
105. See supra note 51.
106. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
107. 542 F.2d at 672.
108. Id. See also W. PROSSER, supra note 38, at § 122; W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 39,
at 431.
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C. Simpson or Jones - Which Should Prevail?
The Simpson and Jones decisions have persisted as the predom-
inant precedents in federal actions for interspousal electronic surveil-
lance. Confusion often arises when courts attempt to select between
two powerfully written opinions which are diametrically opposed; it
becomes difficult to ascertain which model is the most accurate ba-
rometer of the legislature's intent.
Despite the fact that the courts studied identical legislative
materials, the interpretations espoused by both courts were antitheti-
cal. Simpson chose to disregard the congressional concern over the
incidence of interspousal wiretapping by improperly implying an ex-
ception for married persons." ' In opposition, the Jones court trans-
lated the statute and analyzed the legislative history in the tradi-
tional manner by construing the available resources in accordance
with the precise language written or spoken by Congress. 110 The
Jones approach is the more appropriate procedure. If individual jus-
tices are permitted to interject their own personal preferences into
the application of the laws, inevitably consistency will be lacking.
Uniform application is a prerequisite to successful regulation in any
realm of the law.
Simpson also contended that the "limited" amount of references
to interspousal wiretapping during legislative hearings indicates that
it was not a principle concern of Congress and, therefore, should not
be subject to the restrictions of Title III.1 The importance of these
references should not be discounted so hastily. The existence of
ongoing commentary on this category of electronic surveillance illus-
trates the presence of congressional concern and the need for appro-
priate regulatory measures.' While interspousal wiretapping may
not have been the primary focus of the Act,"' it should not be dis-
missed from the sphere of activities dictated by Title III solely be-
109. See supra notes 85-88 and accompanying text.
110. See supra notes 97-101 and accompanying text. See also J. CARR, supra note 14,
at § 2.5(e). The author contended:
If Title Ill as applied is to fulfill the congressional objective of preserving
conversational privacy from unjustified electronic surveillance, its provisions
must be strictly construed in favor of privacy interests, because Congress in-
tended Title Ill's procedural controls to be a "precondition to the acceptability
of any wiretapping at all." Less than strict enforcement of those procedural con-
trols would "throw Congress's entire conception into jeopardy," and Title III can
withstand constitutional challenge only by a limited reading of its authority to
invade privacy.
I ll. See supra note 85.
112. See supra notes 100-101 and accompanying text.
113. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
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cause Congress failed to fully emphasize its importance.
In addition, the Simpson court relied on its own classification of
interspousal wiretapping as a domestic conflict which should be han-
dled solely by state courts. " 4 Despite the marital status of the par-
ties involved, a wrong has still been committed in violation of a fed-
eral statute.11 5 Courts should not be permitted to segregate specified
individuals and deny them an adequate remedy especially on the ba-
sis of their marital status.
The Jones court properly scoffed at the idea of regarding the
victim's marital status as a relevant factor in ascertaining whether a
cause of action could be brought." " As a corollary, the court also
justifiably denounced interspousal immunity as a barrier to recov-
ery.1 17 Although Jones, unlike Simpson, involved the imposition of
criminal charges which cannot be precluded by interspousal immu-
nity, " 8 the doctrine is equally inappropriate in a civil damage action.
The hostility between spouses entangled in surveillance activities is
intense, often too intense to reconcile. The marriage has become
meaningless. There is, therefore, no valid reason to attempt the sal-
vation of marriage through the implementation of the interspousal
immunity doctrine. Simpson overlooked this important factor which
should be an obvious consequence of the spouse's monitoring activi-
ties. The reality of the situation should not be ignored. The Jones
position, therefore, is the most rational approach to the disposition of
interspousal wiretapping cases.
D. Case Law in Support of Simpson
Two distinct lines of cases have evolved as a result of the Simp-
son and Jones decisions. Adherence to the Simpson rationale, al-
though not as strong, continues to reappear. In Anonymous v. Anon-
ymous," 9 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals strictly followed
Simpson despite its distinguishable fact pattern. 20 Anonymous in-
volved a situation in which a husband intercepted incoming tele-
114. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
11 5. Eavesdropping has never been condoned. Blackstone once wrote, "[e]avesdroppers,
or such as listen under walls or windows, or the eaves of a house, to hearken after discourse,
and there upon to frame slanderous and mischievous tales, are a common nuisance .... " 4
W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 169.
116. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
117. See supra notes 104-108 and accompanying text.
118. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
119. 558 F.2d 677 (2d Cir. 1977).
120. As previously noted, Simpson was strictly limited to the facts of that case. See
supra note 91. The facts of Anonymous differ substantially.
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phone calls from his wife. The calls were intended for their eight
year old daughter, of whom the father had custody. 2' The father
had instructed their son to depress the "Record" button on the tele-
phone answering machine whenever the mother called his residence.
It was in this manner that the conversations were surreptitiously
intercepted. 2
The court of appeals classified this conduct as a "purely domes-
tic conflict . . . a matter clearly to be handled by the state
courts.' 2 ' This invasion of privacy did not extend to external third
parties; it was confined to the members of the family unit. 24 The
court concluded that the presence of a custody battle placed this
conduct in the category of a "purely domestic conflict" which is gov-
erned by state law.' 2 5 The court, however, mistakenly placed its em-
phasis on the husband's motives for his actions rather than the ac-
tual result of his actions. Title III affords a federal remedy for
victims of all unauthorized electronic surveillance. 126 If an intercep-
tion is not specifically permitted by the statute, no rationalization or
categorization should sanction its occurrence, marital status
included.
The court equated the Anonymous type of interception with
eavesdropping on an extension phone within the home. To rule other-
wise, the court said, would be to make a distinction without a differ-
ence. 127 In essence, this argument places interspousal wiretaps within
the parameters of the extension phone exemption which is an enu-
merated exception to Title 111.128
An important distinction can be made, however, between listen-
ing to a conversation and actually recording it. A recorded intercep-
tion is a potentially permanent product which may affect continual
121. 558 F.2d at 678. The father also had temporary custody of their son.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 679.
124. The court went on to state:
We do not condone the husband's activity in this, nor do we suggest that a
plaintiff could never recover damages from his or her spouse under the federal
wiretap statute. We merely hold that the facts of this case do not rise to the level
of a violation of that statute.
Id.
125. Id.
126. See supra note 9.
127. 558 F.2d at 679.
128. Id. In addition, the court stated that because of its ruling, there was no need to
reach the issue of whether the eight year old daughter consented to the interception thereby
rendering it lawful. Nor was it necessary to decide whether the daughter, as a minor, had the
capacity to consent and if she lacked such capacity, whether her father, acting as her guard-
ian, had the authority to consent for her. Id. at 679-80.
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harm upon its victim. The violation of privacy may reoccur on nu-
merous occasions. Therefore, the need for regulation is greater where
the conversation is recorded. Despite this distinction, some courts
continue to view both activities as being analogous.
A recent opinion rendered on the issue of interspousal electronic
surveillance, decided in 1986, is the case of Lizza v. Lizza. 29 The
District Court for the Eastern District of New York chose to adhere
to the rationale articulated in Simpson and dismissed a wife's claim
against her husband for civil damages pursuant to Title 111.130 After
weighing the arguments expounded in previous rulings, the court
concluded that "the reading of the statute adopted by the Fifth Cir-
cuit in Simpson is the sounder one."1'' It also found the Second Cir-
cuit's reasoning in Anonymous to be applicable to the case before
it. 12
The court perceived increasing federal control over the domestic
relations of the family as a potential consequence of implementing
Title III's prohibitions in cases of interspousal wiretapping. "' This
does not appear to be a legitimate concern, however, because it is
highly unlikely that federal governmental regulation of domestic re-
lations would increase as a result of the application of Title III. Title
III's only purpose is to control unlawful wiretapping. It does not fo-
cus specifically on the marital relationship; it applies to all persons
equally.
The court's refusal to execute the Act's proscriptions within the
marital unit was based on a lack of evidence in the statutory lan-
guage and legislative history that Congress intended to include
spouses within its scope. " 4 This argument may be refuted, however,
by the clarity of the statutory language and the references made by
Congress to the widespread private use of electronic surveillance, es-
pecially within the home. " 5
129. 631 F. Supp. 529 (E.D.N.Y. 1986).
130. The facts in Lizza differ from those in Simpson in that the recorded conversations
were between Mrs. Lizza and her sister-in-law, an employee of Pennysaver Publications, Inc.,
pertaining to the transference of her stock interest in a family corporation to Pennysaver. This
information was to be used in subsequent divorce proceedings to ensure the equitable distribu-
tion of the marital property. Id. at 530.
131. Id. at 533.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. In addition, the court concluded that "a third party is no less barred from suit
under Title Ill than a member of the familial residence." Id.
135. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
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E. Case Law in Support of Jones
A separate line of cases has emerged in support of the Jones
court's position which refused to recognize an implied exception to
Title III for persons within a marital relationship. Kratz v. Kratz'31
made a forceful argument for this proposition and initiated an in-
tense criticism of the Simpson ruling. The Kratz court found the
reasoning in Simpson to be unsubstantiated since the result was
reached "by ignoring traditional principles of statutory interpreta-
tion. 1 8 7 The District Court went on to accuse the Simpson court of
engaging in judicial legislation by interpreting the plain words of the
statute to mean otherwise. 138 It also attacked the Simpson court for
improperly consulting the legislative history after disregarding the
clarity of the statutory provisions.139
After a thorough examination of the legislative materials, the
Kratz court found that the legislative history was not totally incon-
clusive.1 40 Congress had evinced an awareness of interspousal wire-
tapping and recognized the necessity of minimizing its occurrence.141
The district court enhanced its position further by quoting Professor
Robert Blakey,"" "Title III was intended to mean what it says - no
surveillance by third parties without a warrant - by cops, spouses,
or in business-labor or by any other relevant relations."' 43
The numerous references to interspousal electronic surveillance
among the members of Congress should not be ignored or disposed
of as irrelevant when the interpretations of the law differ so tremen-
dously. Eventually, the desire for uniformity will lead to an ultimate
determination of Title III's boundaries. To diminish the amount of
confusion in this area of the law and to reach a rational determina-
136. 477 F. Supp. 463 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
137. Id. at 468. For further clarification as to when a statute should be strictly con-
strued see C. SANDS, supra note 27, at § 48.01.
138. 477 F. Supp. at 469-70.
139. Id. at 469. The court had previously stated that often the legislative history of a
statute will be inconclusive and may be:
at best an imprecise barometer of congressional intent. Hundreds of persons
are involved in the writing and ultimate enactment of a statute, and they may
have many different opinions as to the meaning of the statute they have created
. . . On the other hand, the statute itself, as enacted, is the unitary voice of the
legislative body. Therefore, when the statutory language is unambiguous, its
plain words and meaning . . . cannot be overcome by a legislative history . . ..
Id.
140. Id. at 470.
141. Id.
142. See supra note 17.
143. 477 F. Supp. at 472 (quoting Correspondence from Professor G. Robert Blakey to
William J. Holt, September 2, 1975).
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tion as to whether the Act pertains to the marital relationship, all
sources of information should be closely scrutinized.
The Kratz court addressed the Simpson court's analogy be-
tween interspousal wiretaps and Title III's "extension phone exemp-
tion." Valid distinctions between the two forms of eavesdropping
were asserted. The ultimate product of a wiretap and the amount of
supervision required to obtain that product differ substantially from
merely eavesdropping on the extension phone in the home."", The
potential for abuse is much more significant with the creation of a
tangible product which can be disclosed to numerous persons on nu-
merous occasions. The court concluded that Congress perceived
these distinctions as significant and thereby provided an exception
for the less detrimental invasion."
Interspousal immunity was addressed briefly by the Kratz court,
but only to dismiss it as a relevant consideration. The court suc-
cinctly stated: "[T]he cause of action . . . is provided by federal law
and cannot be subverted by any state law or policy.'" This is a
legitimate concern because the uniform application of federal laws
would be frustrated if conflicting state laws were permitted to
prevail.
As a corollary to this concept, the court held that under Title
III the federal government was not unlawfully intruding into the
state controlled area of domestic relations." 7 Rather, it was seeking
solely to regulate electronic surveillance activities, not the marital
relations involved.' The court noted:
144.
There are two vital distinctions between an extension phone and a wiretap
as they are used to intercept private conversations - the degree of human su-
pervision and the potential product. Extension phone eavesdropping requires the
presence of the eavesdropper, and therefore human frailties [sic] such as hunger
and sleep are limiting factors. Also, as should be obvious, detection is a real
problem to the eavesdropper who uses an extension phone. All of this necessarily
affects the product that can be realistically derived from this type of surveil-
lance. In contrast, a wiretap depends upon a minimum of human supervision.
After installation, only periodic visits might be needed for maintenance, and this,
as well as the technical sophistication of a wiretap, dramatically reduces the
danger of detection. The product of such a tap, if desired, can reflect all the
conversations that occur through the phone at all hours of the day. Therefore,
extension phone eavesdropping has much less potential for violating the privacy
of the targeted party, and . ..the privacy of innocent third parties, than a
wiretap.
Id. at 474 (quoting Comment, supra note 66, at 205-06).
145. Id. at 475.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 475-76.
148. Id. at 476.
91 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW SPRING 1987
The evils of electronic surveillance are not peculiar to the
marital relationship, and there is no more reason to permit hus-
band and wives to perpetrate these evils upon each other with
impunity than there is to permit them legally to commit crimes
against each other. " 9
These principles were reiterated in Heyman v. Heyman,150
which involved a wiretap inconspicuously placed on the telephone of
a woman who continued to reside with her husband pending the final
entry of their divorce decree. 61 The district court concluded that Ti-
tle III prohibited the commission of interspousal electronic surveil-
lance. 152 It relied primarily upon Jones and Kratz, and cited their
findings as to the proper statutory interpretation and congressional
intent.15
3
Heyman strongly denounced the proposition that Title III un-
justly interfered with the doctrine of interspousal immunity."" The
court found the public policy arguments that serve as the foundation
of the doctrine to be immaterial in these cases, 55 noting that the
preservation of domestic tranquility is a futile goal once marital rela-
tions have deteriorated below the level of reconciliation. 15 6 Moreover,
although the court failed to emphasize the fact, collusive lawsuits are
virtually unknown in interspousal wiretapping cases.
The court went on further to denounce the common contention
that Title III was, in essence, a federal law intervening into marital
relations - an area long regulated by the states. 157 Citing Kratz, the
court stated:
[The Act] proscribes one method of gathering evidence in
149. Id. The court justified its application of Title III in Kratz by stating:
We deal here only with a fundamental and cherished human right, that of
privacy. The enjoyment of that right has been seriously imperiled by modern
technology, prompting Congress to enact Title Ill as a barrier to further en-
croachment upon such enjoyment. Since the right of privacy has been afforded
federal statutory protection, there is no justification for a federal court,
presented with an "interspousal" Title Ill suit, to dismiss that suit by stating
that it involves only a "domestic conflict."
Id.
150. 548 F. Supp. 1041 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
151. Id. at 1043.
152. Id. at 1045.
153. The Jones and Kratz courts' determinations as to the proper interpretation of the
available legislative materials as well as the proper statutory interpretation are fully stated in
their opinions. See generally United States v. Jones, 542 F.2d 661, 666-71 (6th Cir. 1976);
Kratz v. Kratz, 477 F. Supp. 463, 467-71 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
154. 548 F. Supp. at 1047.
155. See supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
156. 548 F. Supp. at 1047.
157. Id.
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inter alia, domestic relations cases, but in no manner deals with
the merits of such cases. The statute is unconcerned with ques-
tions of divorce, support, custody, property, etc., and though two
opposing parties to the instant parties are married, this case re-
quires no resolution of such issues.'5O
This viewpoint was reaffirmed in 1984. In Pritchard v. Pritch-
ard,169 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that "there is no
express exception for instances of willful, unconsented to electronic
surveillance between spouses." 160 The court arrived at its conclusion
after examining both lines of cases and placing strong emphasis on
the analysis of the Jones and Kratz courts in a manner consistent
with the Heyman decision.161 Pritchard represents the continuing vi-
tality of the Jones decision in this area of the law.
V. Personal v. Marital Privacy: Does the Right of Privacy Termi-
nate at the Altar?
Preservation of privacy is an issue of growing national concern
among the American public. 1 2 Although the right of privacy would
appear to be at the core of wiretapping cases, when interspousal
wiretapping is at issue, the courts have been reluctant to address its
role in the controversy. The question arises whether, within the mari-
tal relationship, the right of privacy is a personal right or one solely
applicable to the marital unit as an independent entity.
The right of privacy was examined in the seminal case Griswold
158. Id. (quoting Kratz, 477 F. Supp. at 475).
159. 732 F.2d 372 (4th Cir. 1984).
160. Id. at 374.
161. Id. at 372-74. Additional federal opinions which adhere to the position that an
implied exception to Title IIl does not exist for marital partners include Citron v. Citron, 539
F. Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), affrd, 722 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 973
(1984) (dismissal of complaint due to defendant's lack of willfulness in conducting wiretapping
activity); Flynn v. Flynn, 560 F. Supp. 922 (N.D. Ohio 1983); Gill v. Wilier, 482 F. Supp. 776
(W.D.N.Y. 1980); Remington v. Remington, 393 F. Supp. 898 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
State cases which follow this stance include Ransom v. Ransom, 253 Ga. 656, 324 S.E.2d
437 (1985); Burgess v. Burgess, 447 So.2d 220 (Fla. 1984); Stamme v. Stamme, 589 S.W.2d
50 (Mo. App. 1979); Rickenbaker v. Rickenbaker, 28 N.C. App. 644, 222 S.E.2d 463, modi-
fied and aff'd, 290 N.C. 373, 226 S.E.2d 347 (1976). But see Baumrind v. Ewing, 276 S.C.
350, 279 S.E.2d 359 (1981) (espousing the opposing view which follows Simpson).
162. A. WESTIN, THE DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY: A NATIONAL OPINION RESEARCH SUR-
VEY OF ATTITUDES TOWARD PRIVACY 12 (1981). Personal studies conducted by the author
revealed various statistics on the attitudes toward privacy in this country. For example, three
out of four Americans equate the right of privacy with the inalienable right to life, liberty and
the pursuit of happiness. Id. at 5. Such strong convictions warrant the protection of the gov-
ernment to prevent their demise. In addition, the fact that one in ten Americans believe that
their telephone has been wiretapped in the past may be indicative of the necessity for regula-
tion in this area. Id. at 20.
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v. Connecticut," s which analyzed the maxim that the specific guar-
antees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras which create zones of
privacy.16' Within these zones is the concept of marital privacy,
which the Court characterized as a fundamental constitutional guar-
antee. 165 The unity of marriage was depicted as a sacred association
that should remain free from unlawful invasions."a6
As the law of privacy evolved, the Supreme Court continued to
refine the scope of its definition. In Eisenstadt v. Baird,1 67 the Court
struck down the constitutionality of a Massachusetts law which
made it a felony to distribute contraceptive devices to unmarried
persons. 1 8 In concluding that the law was discriminatory, the Court
asserted:
[T]he marital couple is not an independent entity with a
mind and heart of its own, but an association of two individuals
each with a separate intellectual and emotional makeup. If the
right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual,
married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental in-
trusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the
decision whether to bear or beget a child." 9
163. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). In Griswold, the Court declared a Connecticut statute that
provided criminal sanctions for the use of contraceptives or for aiding in their use
unconstitutional.
164. Id. at 484. The Court expounded on this concept by specifically identifying from
which amendments the right of privacy emanates:
The right of association contained in the penumbra of the First Amendment
is one, as we have seen. The Third Amendment in its prohibition against the
quartering of soldiers "in any house" in time of peace without the consent of the
owner is another facet of that privacy. The Fourth Amendment explicitly affirms
the "right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures." The Fifth Amendment in its Self-
Incrimination Clause enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which gov-
ernment may not force him to surrender to his detriment. The Ninth Amend-
ment provides: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not
be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people."
Id.
165. Id. at 485. See also Poe v. UlIman, 367 U.S. 497, 553 (1961) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
166. The Court in Griswold based its holding on the following rationale:
We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights - older than
our political parties, older than our school system. Marriage is a coming together
for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being
sacred. It is an association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in
living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects.
Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior
decisions.
381 U.S. at 486.
167. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
168. Id. at 454-55.
169. Id. at 453.
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This principle was followed in Planned Parenthood v. Dan-
forth,170 a case involving a Missouri abortion statute. The constitu-
tionality of specified provisions of the statute was challenged. One of
these provisions required the written consent of the spouse of any
woman seeking an abortion prior to the procedure unless a licensed
physician approved it as necessary for her survival. In declaring
the provision unconstitutional, the Court relied heavily on its reason-
ing in previous "privacy" cases.17 2 While the Court recognized the
importance of the marital relationship, 17  and the necessity for mu-
tual decision-making when considering the termination of a preg-
nancy, 17 4 it also acknowledged that:
when the wife and the husband disagree on this decision,
the view of only one of the two marriage partners can prevail.
Inasmuch as it is the woman who physically bears the child and
who is the more directly and immediately affected by the preg-
nancy, as between the two, the balance weighs in her favor.'7 5
Despite the continual recognition of marital privacy by the
courts, Eisenstadt and Danforth stand for the proposition that the
right of privacy is first and foremost a personal right. 7 6 Each spouse
continues to possess an individual privacy interest after marriage
which should remain free from all wrongful intrusions.
The personal right of privacy in one's bodily integrity differs
only in degree from the personal right of privacy in one's thoughts
and conversations. Although the courts have failed to address this
issue, it provides a powerful argument in favor of implementing Title
170. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
171. Id. at 67-68.
172. See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S.
438 (1972).
173. 428 U.S. 52, 69 (1976).
174.
It seems manifest then, ideally, the decision to terminate a pregnancy
should be one concurred in by both the wife and her husband. No marriage may
be viewed as harmonious or successful if the marriage partners are fundamen-
tally divided on so important and vital an issue. But it is difficult to believe that
the goal of fostering mutuality and trust in a marriage, and of strengthening the
marital relationship and the marriage institution, will be achieved by giving the
husband a veto power exercisable for any reason whatsoever or for no reason at
all.
Id. at 71.
175. Id. The Court referred to Roe v. Wade as the source of its conclusion. In permit-
ting the procurement of an abortion under limited circumstances, Roe sets forth numerous
justifications for the termination of a pregnancy. 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
176. See supra note 169 and accompanying text. See also 428 U.S. 52, 70 n. I (1976).
This concept is more easily applied when the conduct directly affects one spouse independently
of the other. Id. at 71.
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III to regulate interspousal wiretapping.
The right of marital privacy has continually prevented govern-
mental regulation of the intimate activities of a husband and wife,
experiences which are shared by both spouses as a couple, 17 but a
line of demarcation is usually drawn when the conduct changes from
an act with the spouse to an act against the spouse. At this point, the
government will intervene to protect the interests of the victim. 178
Interspousal electronic surveillance is not an activity in which
both spouses participate as a unit. On the contrary, the spouse who
has been victimized by the interception is generally ignorant of its
occurrence until the product is later used as a weapon against him or
her in divorce or child custody proceedings. No consent has been
granted nor has collaboration occurred. Interspousal wiretapping is a
unilateral act performed by one spouse with the intent to seize the
private conversations of the other. It may be considered an act which
deviates from traditional marital activities. It should therefore be re-
moved from the scope of conduct customarily immune from govern-
mental regulation.
VI. Conclusion
Interspousal electronic surveillance is becoming increasingly
common in this country. There is a strong need to minimize its fre-
quency and to protect the legitimate privacy interests of the spouse
who falls victim to its usage. Privacy does not terminate with the
words "I do."' !7 9 It is a right personal to the individual and must be
shielded from all illicit encroachments.
It seems obvious that Title III was meant to encompass in-
stances of interspousal wiretapping. Its provisions are explicit and
comprehensive. 180 All authorized wiretapping activities are specifi-
cally designated within the statutory language of the Act.' 8 ' It is
apparent that Congress was aware of these dishonest, intrusive inva-
sions often committed between spouses as it identified this fact on
numerous occasions throughout the long extensive hearings con-
ducted in conjunction with the formulation of a federal regulatory
177. See supra note 5.
178. Spousal rape has been specifically prohibited in the vast majority of states due to
the harm it imposes on the wife. See generally People v. Liberta, 64 N.Y.2d 152, 474 N.E.2d
567 (1984); Warren v. State, 255 Ga. 151, 336 S.E.2d 221 (1985); State v. Smith, 85 N.J.
193, 426 A.2d 38 (1981); Weishaupt v. Com., 227 Va. 389, 315 S.E.2d 847 (1984).
179. See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
180. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
181. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
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measure for electronic surveillance.18 2 It can be inferred from these
findings that Congress sought to control such actions by placing
them within the purview of the federal wiretapping statute.
Additionally, the doctrine of interspousal immunity should be of
no concern in the implementation of Title III. It is an antiquated
state tort law which is well on its way toward abrogation. The public
policy arguments advanced in its defense are inapplicable in cases of
interspousal electronic surveillance.' s What marital harmony ex-
isted prior to the intrusion has been shattered, thus no longer requir-
ing protection. The probability of spousal collusion under these cir-
cumstances is extremely minute, especially when criminal sanctions
are pursued. Finally, frivolous lawsuits are not a common occurrence
and should not be a deciding factor in determining whether Title III
pertains to interspousal wiretapping.
If interspousal immunity continued to be uniformly followed
within the United States and the public policy arguments were rele-
vant, the doctrine would still have no bearing in wiretapping cases
under the Act. Title III is a federal statute which creates a flat ban
on all unauthorized wiretapping activities. 184 Therefore, state tort
law cannot preempt it.185
Although the circuits continue to split on this issue, the trend is
toward allowing a federal cause of action to be brought against the
"snooping" spouse. Title III should be implemented in cases of inter-
spousal electronic surveillance, and should be done so consistently in
order to achieve the ultimate goal of protecting the privacy of wire
communications.186
Dorian L. Rowe
182. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
183. See supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
184. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
185. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
186. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.

